A breakdown in the chain of command?
The following is a summary of what occurred prior to the battle, during the battle, and the impact on US actions following it. It comes from several detailed articles reviewing the situation. I have also included my recollections of what occurred and what was discussed by the staff officers of the Joint Staff, primarily those assigned to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC). At the time of the battle, I was assigned as the Reconnaissance and Single Integrated Operations Plan officer (RSO) on Operations Team 1, NMCC. I was assigned to Ops Team 1 on 20 January 1993 and served there through 1993. I then served in the Joint Reconnaissance Center until February 1996.
Two of the NMCC’s primary tasks are to monitor worldwide events of defense significance and to coordinate a crisis response as needed. Much of the monitoring function entailed reading intelligence and operations reports sent in by overseas commands and forwarding the information to upper levels of military and civilian decision makers. As the RSO I was tasked to comment on numerous intelligence reports and asked about possible reconnaissance operations that could confirm the information.
While assigned to Ops Team 1, the Battle of Mogadishu occurred, 3-4 October 1993. Ops Team 1 was on duty during a portion of the battle and forwarded situation reports (SITREP) to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Unfortunately, there was little we could do to coordinate a crisis response since we had no troops or aircraft, not assigned to the forces already in place, to task for support. All we could do was monitor the response by the 10th Mountain Division Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and the Malaysian and Pakistani forces in Mogadishu.
Before looking at specifics of the battle, I want to set the stage for US involvement in Somalia. Most of this comes from various sources as indicated.
“In 1992, clan-based civil-war fighting and one of the worst African droughts of the century created famine conditions that threatened one-fourth of Somalia’s population with starvation. In August 1992, the United Nations began a peacekeeping mission to the country to ensure the distribution of food and medical aid, but it was largely unsuccessful. With U.N. troops unable to control Somalia’s warring factions, security deteriorating, and thousands of tons of food stranded in portside warehouses, President (George H.W.) Bush ordered a large U.S. military force to the area on December 4, 1992. Five days later, the first U.S. Marines landed in the first phase of “Operation Restore Hope.”” (1)
“With the aid of U.S. military troops and forces from other nations, the U.N. succeeded in distributing desperately needed food to many starving Somalis. However, with factional fighting continuing unabated, and the U.N. without an effective agenda to resolve the political strife, there seemed no clear end in sight to Operation Restore Hope when President Bill Clinton took office in January 1993.”(1)
“…, Clinton was anxious to bring the Americans home, and in May the mission was formally handed back to the United Nations. By June 1993, only 4,200 U.S. troops remained. However, on June 5, 24 Pakistani U.N. peacekeepers inspecting a weapons storage site were ambushed and massacred by Somalia soldiers under the warlord General Mohammed Aidid. U.S. and U.N. forces subsequently began an extensive search for the elusive strongman, and in August, 400 elite U.S. troops from Delta Force and the U.S. Rangers (Task Force Ranger (TFR)) arrived on a mission to capture Aidid. Two months later, on October 3-4, 18 of these soldiers were killed and 84 wounded during a disastrous assault on Mogadishu’s Olympia Hotel in search of Aidid (and/or high level advisors). The bloody battle, which lasted 17 hours, was the most violent U.S. combat firefight since Vietnam. As many as 1,000 Somalis were killed.” (1)
“Three days later, with Aidid still at large, President Clinton cut his losses and ordered a total U.S. withdrawal. On March 25, 1994, the last U.S. troops left Somalia, leaving 20,000 U.N. troops behind to facilitate “nation-building” in the divided country. The U.N. troops departed in 1995 and political strife and clan-based fighting continued in Somalia into the 21st century.” (1) As discussed later, the withdrawal did not occur until all the resources originally asked for to conduct the operations were deployed to Mogadishu in order to cover the withdrawal. President Clinton issued orders that military operations would only be for self-defense. (3[81])
This deployment and engagement of US forces in a combat situation was the first such action directed by President Clinton and SecDef Aspin. There was a great deal of discussion at the Joint Staff about the number of troops deployed to Somalia and the kind of support they needed. Our direction from the SecDef and presumably the President was that the US would deploy the minimum amount of force necessary to support the troops and the ongoing humanitarian operations, and we would not deploy armored units. The idea was that they weren’t needed based on the threat and we wanted to keep our footprint small. This position was made very clear in a meeting between Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell and SecDef Aspin, “In September 1993, General Powell asked Aspin to approve the request of the U.S. commander in Somalia for tanks, armored vehicles, and AC-130 Spectre gunships for his forces. Aspin turned down the request and didn't take Powell's request seriously. … While Powell presented to Aspin (the need for) additional tanks, armored vehicles, AC-130 Spectre gunships air-support to support the U.S. Troops that were about to be deployed for Battle of Mogadishu and discussing the battle preparation. instead of paying attention to Powell’s recommendation, Aspin was more focused on wolfing down his salad, causing Powell to grow more irritated towards Aspin (many people) believed (this) to be the primary reason of Powell ‘s early departure as Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff.(3[24])” Keep in mind, deploying armored units also requires the deployment of a significant logistics unit to support them. As discussed above, as time went on and the clan attacks increased on UN/US forces, the mission for the military shifted from protecting the humanitarian aid efforts to hunting down General Mohammed Aidid and his militia. Unfortunately, as these operations were conducted, a number of Somali civilians were killed and this turned the population against the military operations and also caused the general population to support Aidid over the foreign invaders.
Several different US military units were in Mogadishu conducting various missions. 10th Mountain Division with helicopters from the 101st Airborne Division in support of UNOSOM II humanitarian operations. Task Force Ranger (TFR) under MG William Garrison with Army Rangers, Delta Force Special Operators and helicopter support from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment were tasked with capturing General Aidid. There were also forces there from Malaysia and Pakistan and they had armored personnel carriers and medium tanks. (2) These were the primary troops engaged in the battle of 3-4 October 1993. The following is a description of what occurred.
(Extracts from Source 3, references from Source 3 shown in[ ]) “On 3 October 1993, special operations forces consisting of Bravo Company 3rd Battalion, the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, and the 160th Aviation Battalion, attempted to capture Aidid’s foreign minister, Omar Salad Elmer and his top political advisor, Mohamed Hassan Awake.[36]”
“The plan was that Delta operators would assault the target building using MH-6 Little Bird helicopters, and secure the targets inside the building. Four Ranger chalks under Captain Michael D. Steele's command would fast-rope down from hovering MH-60L Black Hawks. Rangers would create a four-corner defensive perimeter around the target building to isolate it and ensure that no enemy could get in or out.[37]”
“A column of nine HMMWVs (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle) and three M939 five-ton trucks under Lieutenant Colonel Danny McKnight's command would arrive at the building to take the entire assault team and their prisoners back to base. The entire operation was estimated to take no longer than 30 minutes.[38]”
“The ground-extraction convoy was supposed to reach the captive targets a few minutes after the operation's beginning, but it ran into delays. Somali citizens and local militia formed barricades along Mogadishu's streets with rocks, wreckage, rubbish and burning tires, blocking the convoy from reaching the Rangers and their captives. Aidid militiamen with megaphones were shouting, "Come out and defend your homes!"[39]”
“At 13:50, Task Force Ranger analysts received intelligence of Salad's location. The soldiers, vehicle convoys, and helicopters were on high alert stand by until the code word "Irene" was echoed across all the radio channels by command. The code word "Irene" was the word that began the mission and sent the helicopters into the air.[40]”
“At 15:42, the MH-6 assault Little Birds carrying the Delta operators hit the target, the wave of dust becoming so bad that one was forced to go around again and land out of position. Next, the two Black Hawks carrying the second Delta assault team led by DELTA officer Captain Austin S. Miller came into position and dropped their teams as the four Ranger chalks prepared to rope onto the four corners surrounding the target building. Chalk Four being carried by Black Hawk Super 67, piloted by CW3 Jeff Niklaus, was accidentally put a block north of their intended point. Declining the pilot's offer to move them back down due to the time it would take to do so, leaving the helicopter too exposed, Chalk Four intended to move down to the planned position, but intense ground fire prevented them from doing so.”
“The ground convoy arrived ten minutes later near the Olympic Hotel target building [41] and waited for Delta and Rangers to complete their mission. During the operation's first moments, Private First Class Todd Blackburn fell while fast-roping from Super 67 while it hovered 70 feet (21 m) above the streets. Blackburn suffered numerous head injuries and required evacuation by Sergeant Jeff Struecker's column of three Humvees. While taking Blackburn back to base, Sergeant Dominick Pilla, assigned to Struecker's Humvee, was killed instantly when a bullet struck his head.[42] The Humvee column arrived back at base, full of bullet holes and emitting smoke from the damage.[39]”
“At about 16:20, one of the Black Hawks, Super 61, piloted by CW3 Cliff "Elvis" Wolcott and CW3 Donovan "Bull" Briley, was shot down by an RPG-7. Both pilots were killed in the resulting crash and two of the crew chiefs, Staff Sgt. Ray Dowdy and Staff Sgt. Charlie Warren, were severely wounded. Staff Sergeant Daniel Busch and Sergeant Jim Smith, both Delta snipers, survived the crash and began defending the site. [43]”
“An MH-6, Star 41, piloted by CW3 Karl Maier and CW5 Keith Jones, landed nearby. Jones left the helicopter and carried Busch to the safety of the helicopter, while Maier provided cover fire from the cockpit repeatedly denying orders to lift off while his co-pilot was not in the Bird. Maier nearly hit Chalk One's Lieutenant Tom DiTomasso, arriving with Rangers and Delta operators to secure the site. Jones and Maier evacuated Busch and Smith. Busch later died of his injuries, having been shot four times while defending the crash site.”
“A combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, led by Delta Captain Bill J. Coultrup, Air Force Master Sergeant Scott C. Fales, and Air Force Technical Sergeant Timothy A. Wilkinson, were able to fast rope down to the Super 61 crash site despite an RPG hit that crippled their helicopter, Super 68, piloted by CW3 Dan Jollota and Maj. Herb Rodriguez. Despite the damage, Super 68 did make it back to base. The CSAR team found both the pilots dead and two wounded inside the crashed helicopter. Under intense fire, the team moved the wounded men to a nearby collection point, where they built a makeshift shelter using kevlar armor plates salvaged from Super 61's wreckage.[44]”
“Communications were confused between the ground convoy and the assault team. The assault team and the ground convoy waited for 20 minutes to receive their orders to move out. Both units were under the mistaken impression that they were to be first contacted by the other.[45]”
“During the wait, a second Black Hawk helicopter, callsign Super 64 and piloted by Michael Durant, was shot down by an RPG-7 at around 16:40.[46] Most of the assault team went to the first crash site for a rescue operation. Upon reaching the first crash site, about 90 Rangers and Delta Force operators found themselves under heavy fire.[47] Despite air support, the assault team was effectively trapped for the night. With a growing number of wounded needing shelter, they occupied several nearby houses and confined the occupants for the battle's duration.[48]”
“At the second crash site, two Delta snipers, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randy Shughart, were inserted by Super 62, piloted by Mike Goffena and Jim Yacone. Their first two requests to be inserted were denied, but they were finally granted permission after their third request. They inflicted heavy casualties on the approaching Somali mob. Super 62 had kept up their fire support for Gordon and Shughart, but an RPG struck Super 62. Despite the damage, Super 62 managed to land at New Port safely.”
“When Gordon was eventually killed, Shughart picked up Gordon's CAR-15 and gave it to Durant. Shughart went back around the helicopter's nose and held off the mob for about 10 more minutes before he was killed. The Somalis then overran the crash site and killed all but Durant. He was nearly beaten to death, but was saved when members of Aidid's militia came to take him prisoner.[46] For their actions, MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, the first awarded since the Vietnam War.[27]”
“Repeated attempts by the Somalis to mass forces and overrun the American positions in a series of firefights near the first crash site were neutralized by aggressive small arms fire and by strafing runs and rocket attacks from AH-6J Little Bird helicopter gunships of the Nightstalkers, the only air unit equipped and trained for night fighting.”
“A relief convoy with elements from the Task Force 2–14 Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, accompanied by Malaysian and Frontier Force Regiment of Pakistani U.N. forces, arrived at the first crash site at around 02:00. No contingency planning or coordination with U.N. forces had been arranged prior to the operation; consequently, the recovery of the surrounded American troops was significantly complicated and delayed. Determined to protect all of the rescue convoy's members, General Garrison made sure that the convoy would roll out in force.”
“When the convoy finally pushed into the city, it consisted of more than 100 U.N. vehicles including Malaysian forces' German-made Condor APCs, four Pakistani tanks (M48s), American HMMWVs and several M939 five-ton flatbed trucks. This two-mile-long column was supported by several other Black Hawks and Cobra assault helicopters stationed with the 10th Mountain Division. Meanwhile, Task Force Ranger's "Little Birds" continued their defense of Super 61's downed crew and rescuers. The American assault force sustained heavy casualties, including several killed, and a Malaysian soldier died when an RPG hit his Condor vehicle. Seven Malaysians and two Pakistanis were wounded.[32][33]”
“The battle was over by 06:30 on Monday, 4 October. U.S. forces were finally evacuated to the U.N. base by the armored convoy. While leaving the crash site, a group of Rangers and Delta operators led by SSG John R. Dycus realized that there was no room left in the vehicles for them and were forced to depart the city on foot to a rendezvous point on National Street. This has been commonly referred to as the "Mogadishu Mile".”
“In all, 19 U.S. soldiers were killed in action during the battle or shortly after, and another 73 were wounded in action.[49] The Malaysian forces lost one soldier and had seven injured, while the Pakistanis also lost one soldier and suffered two injured. Somali casualties were heavy, with estimates of fatalities ranging from 315 to over 2,000 combatants.[2] The Somali casualties were a mixture of militiamen and local civilians. Somali civilians suffered heavy casualties due to the dense urban character of that portion of Mogadishu.”
“On 6 October 1993, a mortar round fell on the U.S. compound, injuring 12 people and killing Delta Sergeant First Class Matthew L. Rierson, the 19th U.S. soldier killed in the battle. That same day, a team on special mission Super 64 incurred two wounded.[50] Two weeks after the battle, General Garrison officially accepted responsibility. In a handwritten letter to President Clinton, Garrison took full responsibility for the battle's outcome. He wrote that Task Force Ranger had adequate intelligence for the mission and that their objective—capturing targets of value—was met.[51]”
From the article “What You May Not Know About 'Black Hawk Down'” (2), “Michael Durant, the lone survivor of the second Black Hawk that was overrun by Somalis, was captured and held prisoner for 11 days. Robert Oakley, Special Envoy to Somalia, issued a rather blunt ultimatum to Durant’s captors while negotiating his release, stating:
…there’s going to be a fight with your people. The minute the guns start again, all restraint on the U.S. side goes. Just look at the stuff coming in here now. An aircraft carrier, tanks, gunships… the works. Once the fighting starts, all this pent-up anger is going to be released. This whole part of the city will be destroyed…”
“The White House backed up the threat with the deployment of a mechanized infantry unit – including Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles – an additional 10th Mountain battalion, AC-130 Spectre gunships, a new special ops team, and the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier battle group. UNITAF had more firepower than ever before at its disposal, and the president had bluntly expressed a willingness to use it if Durant was not released immediately.”
“How serious the Clinton administration was about escalation is a different matter. As reinforcements were deployed, Washington had already settled upon withdrawal. There was considerable political and public pressure to wrap up things in Somalia and another battle, even for the sole purpose of rescuing an American servicemember, would have complicated matters even further. Fortunately, the Somali warlords took Oakley’s threat seriously and immediately released Durant, facilitating an end to U.S. involvement in Somalia.” (2)
Finally, in looking at the end results from the battle, from source 1, “In a national security policy review session held in the White House on 6 October 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton directed the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, to stop all actions by U.S. forces against Aidid except those required in self-defense. He reappointed Ambassador Robert B. Oakley as special envoy to Somalia in an attempt to broker a peace settlement and then announced that all U.S. forces would withdraw from Somalia no later than 31 March 1994. On 15 December 1993, U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stepped down, taking much of the blame for his decision to refuse requests for tanks and armored vehicles in support of the mission.(3[81][82]) Garrison would write, however, that Aspin was not to blame for the events in Mogadishu. It's also since been noted that the equipment may not have arrived in time to make a difference.(3[83]) A few hundred U.S. Marines remained offshore to assist with any noncombatant evacuation mission that might occur regarding the 1,000-plus U.S. civilians and military advisers remaining as part of the U.S. liaison mission. The Ready Battalion of the 24th Infantry Division, 1–64 Armor, composed 1,300 troops of Task Force Rogue, including the bulk of 1-64 Armor and Infantry troops from her sister battalion 3-15 Infantry. This was the first time M-1 Abrams tanks were delivered by air, using the C-5 Galaxies, which delivered 18 M-1 tanks and 44 Bradley infantry vehicles,(3[84]) while the balance of Task Force Rogues equipment and vehicles were delivered via a roll-on/roll-off ship sent from Fort Stewart (Garden City), Georgia, to Mogadishu to provide armored support for U.S. forces.”
“The Clinton administration in particular endured considerable criticism for the operation's outcome. The main elements of the criticism surround: the administration's decision to leave the region before completing the operation's humanitarian and security objectives; the perceived failure to recognize the threat al-Qaeda elements posed in the region; and the threat against U.S. security interests at home.(3[87]) Critics claim that Osama bin Laden and other members of al-Qaeda provided support and training to Mohammed Farrah Aidid's forces. Osama bin Laden even denigrated the administration's decision to prematurely depart the region, stating that it displayed "the weakness, feebleness and cowardliness of the US soldier".(3[88]) The loss of U.S. military personnel during the Battle of Mogadishu and television images of American soldiers being dragged through the streets by Somalis evoked public outcry. The Clinton administration responded by scaling down U.S. humanitarian efforts in the region.(3[88][89])”
“Fear of a repeat of the events in Somalia shaped U.S. policy in subsequent years, with many commentators identifying the Battle of Mogadishu's graphic consequences as the key reason behind the U.S.'s failure to intervene in later conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide of 1994. According to the U.S.'s former deputy special envoy to Somalia, Walter Clarke: "The ghosts of Somalia continue to haunt US policy. Our lack of response in Rwanda was a fear of getting involved in something like a Somalia all over again."(3[91])”
From what I recall from the after-action report and discussions, one of the significant problems was that TFR and other US and UN Units had not trained together to any great degree and the units/countries were not cleared for the same level of classified intelligence. It was also noted, that in an effort to keep operational security as tight as possible, the attempted capture of Mohammed Aidid and/or high-level advisors was not discussed outside of TFR and as a result, there were no plans in place to support or come to the aid of the assault force in an emergency. Also, as noted above, the whole operation was only expected to last 30 minutes. When a rescue operation was found to be necessary, the 10th Mountain did assemble their Quick Reaction Force and sent it out to rescue the assault force; however, it was badly shot up on its first attempt and had to return to the main base to await support from the Malaysians and Pakistanis. In addition to not having US armored units, support from AC-130 gunships was not available having been denied by SecDef Aspin. The AC-130 could have provided day and night visual intelligence collection and massive firepower against forces in the open.
Keep in mind, UAVs, such as Predator, for video intelligence collection were still in development and not available for operations. Electronic intelligence for this kind of engagement was very little if any and to my knowledge wasn’t requested.
As discussed previously, TFR did not have dedicated US armor support. Again a political decision to keep our presence in Somalia at a low level. There were also several military considerations to take into account.
Use of Armor in a city is difficult and dangerous. The Somalis had RPGs that could destroy a Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) and could disable a M-1 Abrams tank by damaging its tracks.
The roofs of buildings were above the turrets of the armored vehicles and this would allow the Somalis to fire RPGs and throw Molotov cocktails at the top of the vehicles, the least armored portion of a tank or BFV. The loss of armored vehicles to Somali attack was viewed as helping to increase Somali morale.
The M-1 did not have an anti-personnel round for the main gun. It’s only viable armament would be it’s .50 caliber and two 7.62mm machine guns.
Use of armor to destroy buildings indiscriminately would cause more Somalis to join the rebels.
One other question discussed in the reference documents: how was a relatively untrained militia in Somalia able to shoot down and damage several helicopters during this engagement? As described in reference 3, al-Qaeda provided training to the Somalis on how to fire RPGs at helicopters and had participated in the attack by firing RPGs themselves. There was also an unconfirmed report that al-Qaeda may have provided RPGs with proximity warheads. This would have allowed damage to the helicopters without actually hitting them. There are numerous diagrams online showing how proximity fuzing could be accomplished.
One final recommendation that came out of the Joint Staff, was that these kinds of operations cannot occur in isolation. Higher headquarters must know what’s being executed, and what the contingency plans are for emergency situations, they must be planned and coordinated.
Citation Information
Article Title
President Bush orders U.S. troops to Somalia, History.com Editors, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/bush-orders-u-s-troops-to-somalia, February 9, 2010
What You May Not Know About 'Black Hawk Down', Edward D. Chang, October 03, 2018
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mogadishu_(1993) 8/25
[2.] Human Rights Developments (https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1994/WR94/Africa-08.htm), retrieved on 10 November 2009.
[4.] Bowden, Mark (16 November 1997). "Black Hawk Down: A defining battle" (https://web.archive.org/web/20070701164119/http://inquirer.philly.com/ packages/somalia/nov16/rang16.asp). The Philadelphia Inquirer. Archived from the original (http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/nov16/rang16.asp) on 1 July 2007. Retrieved 25 June 2007.
[24.] Bailey, Tracy A (6 October 2008). "Rangers Honor Fallen Brothers of Operation Gothic Serpent" (https://web.archive.org/web/20100304072529/http://shadowspear.com/special-operations-news/rangers_honor_fallen_brothers_of.html). ShadowSpear Special Operations. Archived from the original (http://shadowspear.com/special-operations-news/rangers_honor_fallen_brothers_of.html) on 4 March 2010. Retrieved 13 October 2008.
[27.] Willbanks, James H. (2011). America's Heroes: Medal of Honor Recipients from the Civil War to Afghanistan. ABC-CLIO. p. 308. ISBN 978-1-59884-393-4.
[32.] IBP USA (2007). Malaysia Army Weapon Systems Handbook. Int'l Business Publication. pp. 71–73. ISBN 978-1-4330-6180-6.
[33.] Musharraf, Pervez (2006). In the line of fire: a memoir (https://archive.org/details/ inlineoffirememo00mush/page/74). Simon and Schuster. pp. 74–75 (https://archive.org/details/inlineoffirememo00mush/page/74). ISBN 978-0-7432-8344-1.
[36.] "To Fight With Intrepidity" (https://web.archive.org/web/20070516095147 /http://www.johndlock.com/tfwi/somalia.php3). Archived from the original (http://www.johndlock.com/tfwi/somalia.php3) on 16 May 2007. Retrieved 29 January 2007.
[37.] "This Ranger fought in Mogadishu before becoming a country music star" (https://www.wearethemighty.com/mighty-history/mogadishu-ranger-country-music-star/). We Are The Mighty. 6 July 2020. Retrieved 10 January 2021.
[38.] Casper, Lawrence E. (2001). Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti. Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 39. ISBN 978-1-55587-945-7.
[39.] Bowden, p. 34.
[40.] Eversmann, Matt, and Dan Schilling. The Battle of Mogadishu. Novato, CA: Presidio, 2004. Print.
[41.] Bowden, p. 70.
[42.] "Blackhawk Down" (https://web.archive.org/web/20180513005149/http:// inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/who.asp). The Philadelphia Inquirer. Archived from the original (http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/who.asp) on 13 May 2018. Retrieved 25 August 2013.
[43.] Bowden, p. 70.
[44.] Eversmann, Matthew (SSG) (2005). The Battle of Mogadishu: Firsthand Accounts from the Men of Task Force Ranger. Presidio Press. ISBN 0345466683. p. 129.
[45.] "On this Day, October 3, 1993, Battle of Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down)" (https://sofrep.com/specialoperations/day-october-3-1993-battle-mogadishu-black-hawk/). SOFREP. Retrieved 25 May 2020.
[46.] Eversmann, pp. 34–36.
[47.] Bowden, p. 70.
[48.] The Independent, 12 January 2002, "Black Hawk Down: Shoot first, don't ask questions afterwards" (https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/features/black-hawk-down-shoot-first-dont-ask-questions-afterwards-662919.html), retrieved on 14 December 2006.
[49.] Ambush in Mogadishu (https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ ambush/etc/synopsis.html) 29 September 1998 (Original broadcast date), retrieved on 10 November 2009.
[50.] Casper, Lawrence E. (2001). Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti. Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 95. ISBN 978-1-55587-945-7.
[51.] Moore, Robin.; Michael Lennon (2007). The Wars of the Green Berets: Amazing Stories from Vietnam to the Present (https://archive.org/details/warsofgreenberet0000moor/page/28). Skyhorse Publishing Inc. p. 28 https://archive.org/details/warsofgreenberet0000moor/page/28). ISBN 978-1-60239-054-6.
[81.] Warshaw, Shirley Anne (2004). The Clinton Years: Presidential Profiles Facts on File Library of American History (https://archive.org/details/clintonyears0000wars/page/16) (2 ed.). Infobase Publishing. p. 16 (https://archive.org/details/clintonyears0000wars/page/16). ISBN 978-0-8160-5333-9.
[82.] Johnson, Loch K. (2011). The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America's Search for Security after the Cold War (https://archive.org/details/threatonhorizoni0000john_w1u0). Oxford University Press. pp. 7 (https://archive.org/details/threatonhorizoni0000 john_w1u0/page/7), 19, 26. ISBN 978-0-19-973717-8.
[83.] Just Security, "We Shouldn't Forget the Lessons of Black Hawk Down: Part I", Luke Hartig, 8-29-2017
[84.] Leland, John W.; Wilcoxson, Kathryn A. (May 2003). Office of History Air Mobility Command (ed.). The chronological history of the C-5 Galaxy (http://www.amc.af.mil/Portals/12/ documents/AFD-131018-052.pdf) (PDF). p. 73.
[87.] Miniter, Richard (2004) Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global Terror. Regnery Publishing, p. 44, ISBN 0-89526-048-4
[88.] Thornton, Rod (2007) Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the Twenty-First Century, p. 10, ISBN 0-7456-3365-X
[89.] Dauber, Cori Elizabeth. "The shot seen 'round the world': The impact of the images of Mogadishu on American military operations." Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4.4 (2001): 653-687 online (https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cori_Dauber/publication/236815694_ The_Shot_Seen_%27Round_the_World_The_Impact_of_the_Images_of_Mogadishu_on_American_Military_Operations/links/576941a708ae2d7145ba7bbe.pdf).
[91.] "Ambush in Mogadishu: Transcript" (https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline /shows/ambush/etc/script.html). PBS. Retrieved 27 October 2009.