Over the past several weeks there have generated a number of posts online and comments in other mediums about the possibility of Russia’s Vladimir Putin using tactical nuclear weapons to gain advantage on the battlefield, or at best, a strategic advantage in forcing Ukraine to negotiate a favorable peace settlement toward Russia or possibly an outright surrender. At this point, along with most of the other prognosticators, I would say the jury is still out. Now that Mariupol has fallen and it appears Russia has a land bridge from Russia through the Donbass region to the Crimean Peninsula, Putin may decide to curtail his military operations for now and call an end to the “Special Military Operation”. As I’ve written before, Putin can declare victory in having severely damaged the “Nazi” regime in Kyiv, securing the rights and independence of the Russians in the Donbass region, and sent a message by standing up to potential NATO adventurism against Russia. But Putin hasn’t achieved all of his goals, and critics predict his ouster by hardline war hawks and profit-weary oligarchs.
Which leads to this question: would an embattled, desperate Putin use nuclear weapons to win a war in the Ukraine or against any other country he tries to “reclaim?” To do this, we must first place the use of nuclear weapons in context with Russia’s warfighting doctrine, “Escalate to Deescalate”. This is the doctrine the Russians are prepared to use through the spectrum of conflict, from limited, conventional war, to full-scale conventional war, to limited nuclear war, and finally, to total nuclear war. Secondly, we must define nuclear war, and decide whether it can be kept limited? More importantly, can escalation in the use of nuclear weapons be controlled in terms of destruction? This is a question hovering in the background since the first atomic bombs were dropped by the US on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to influence the Japanese into surrendering at the end of World War II.
Since World War II, use of nuclear weapons has been threatened several times; however, saner minds prevailed, and the application was not attempted. There are several examples involving the US and the USSR and/or China and others, here are a few: Berlin blockade, 1958 – 1961; Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War, 1950 – 1953; Defense of Khe Sanh during the Vietnam War; and US commitment to Israel during the 1973 Arab – Israeli War. In more recent times, we now have Iran threatening nuclear war against Israel, the US and our Arab allies in the Middle East. Pakistan and India appear to have their own version of a Cold War with both sides holding enough weapons to ensure a state of mutually assured destruction (MAD). China threatens a nuclear response against any country helping Taiwan oppose a military operation by China to reunify the two. Finally, you have North Korea leaders threatening a nuclear attack against anyone who threatens them.
How do these threats actually translate into possible military use in a way that doesn’t trigger a full-scale nuclear war? In the case of Russia, according to numerous sources, the use of “tactical” nuclear weapons to achieve advantage in combat is simply an extension of using large scale conventional weapons. It is an escalation in force with the goal of the other side agreeing to Russian terms and then having Russia deescalate its military operations. The Russians have been seen to practice this form of escalation during military exercises. Russia could use “tactical” nuclear weapons to alter the situation of a conventional war if Russia is losing. This would allow Russia to regain a dominant posture in the war and allow Russia to control peace or de-escalation negotiations. In the most recent update to the government’s information paper, “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization”, April 21, 2022, the Congressional Research Service, points out another reason why Russia could employ nuclear weapons. This would be to counter “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the existence of the state is in jeopardy.” What constitutes “the existence of the state is in jeopardy”? If Russia is on the verge of losing a conventional war and possibly the overthrow of the current government, does that constitute a risk to the existence of the state? I believe some commentators would say it is. If Putin were to think he was about to be deposed if he “loses” the war in the Ukraine, he very well might use “tactical” nuclear weapons to change the situation and show his strength and determination to win. Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted definition of “tactical” nuclear weapons or how they can be used without the risk of escalation.
There is an implied ambiguity in differentiating between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Several criteria are used to try and describe the difference: warhead yield/explosive power, range, and the target being attacked. Claiming a nuclear weapon is only being used for a tactical purpose to try and prevent the other side from launching strategic nuclear attack may be impossible as described below. One way of putting it is that one man’s tactical can be another man’s strategic. It’s about perception. A key point to remember is that regardless of the size of the nuclear weapon or where it is used, there will be nuclear contamination that will spread over a large area. That in itself could be considered a nuclear attack on a non-involved country and in the case of a NATO country, could be used to justify a NATO military response. How could this happen? A classic concept for tactical nuclear weapons is that they would be used on the battlefield to gain a tactical advantage. Some possible uses: destroy an enemy strong point and open an area to attack, destroy an enemy airfield or port facility to prevent attacks from those locations, and/or destroy an attacking force breaching your defenses. Any one of these in close proximity to a NATO country could lead to unintended nuclear fallout/contamination. Current yields for tactical nuclear weapons range from approximately 300 tons to 100+ kilotons. Many US weapons are thought to have variable yield settings that allow a weapon to be tailored to the size of the detonation needed to accomplish the desired effect. The Russians may have something similar or a broad spectrum of weapons with different yields. That said, remember that the yield for the Little Boy and Fat Man bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were in the 15 to 20 kiloton range. Those weapons destroyed huge portions of both of those cities, resulted in tens of thousands of casualties, and influenced the Japanese government to surrender. The radioactive fallout from those weapons spread many miles from the detonation point. At the time, these weapons and targets were considered to be strategic in that they were designed/desired to get the Japanese to surrender. In today’s lexicon, strategic nuclear weapons are generally viewed as having larger warheads, longer range, and used to attack significant military, economic and political targets. Strategic nuclear weapons generally have yields in the megaton range. They are used for attacking counterforce/strategic weapons and countervalue/urban economic and political centers. Strategic weapons are generally viewed as weapons used to destroy an opponent’s ability to strike back and to destroy the country’s infrastructure, thereby “winning” the war. If this strike can be conducted before the enemy can launch most of its nuclear weapons, the attacker can greatly reduce the counterstrike damage from its enemy. Fortunately, or unfortunately, depending on which side of the attack you are on, the use of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) by most of the nuclear capable countries all but assures a significant counterstrike to whichever nation launches first. As stated before, the nuclear fallout would spread for miles and contaminate the rest of the world. The key consideration if Putin uses a nuclear weapon is the nexus for deciding if it was tactical or strategic and what kind of world response should follow. If it’s a “tactical” weapon (low yield) used to defend against an overwhelming Ukrainian attack on Russian forces, it will be condemned, but it will not trigger a NATO response. If a nuclear weapon is used for any other purpose by the Russians, the probability of a NATO response will be high, and the risk of escalation will be great. This is something every person in the world will have a grave interest in, since once the nuclear genie is released into the world again, other countries may think it is okay to follow suit in other areas of conflict.
With regard to Russian strategy, the difficult part is that the Ukrainian battlefield covers a large area and includes both countryside and urban areas. There are significant military, economic and political targets scattered throughout the country. And, even though there are no known nuclear counterforce resources in Ukraine, there are significant conventional forces that could eventually defeat the Russian invasion, and as previously discussed, lead to a threat “to the existence of the state” in Russia. Putin could use this to rationalize the use of “tactical” nuclear weapons. Depending on where a “tactical” nuclear weapon is detonated, it could also hold “strategic” implications in trying to force the Ukrainian government to submit to Russian territorial demands or possible surrender pending further nuclear strikes. This would force NATO to evaluate the possibility of Russia using the same strategy to force concessions against former Warsaw Pact countries, all of which are now in NATO.
What is a scenario for what could happen? Once this nuclear threshold is breached, the question is what would NATO do? If NATO responds with conventional force, Putin could use that as an excuse for “tactical” nuclear strikes against NATO assets in Poland, Slovakia, or Hungary that are next to Ukraine to keep NATO from resupplying Ukraine. Nuclear strikes there could possibly prompt retaliatory strikes against Russian targets near Ukraine Keep in mind, these strikes do not have to originate from US sources, Great Britain and/or France could independently or in unison, launch aircraft borne nuclear bombs or SLBMs. The use of either of these two weapons systems will lead to ambiguity about who launched them and very well could lead to Russia launching nuclear retaliation strikes against a larger number of targets in NATO to include the US. The question then becomes can this be kept limited? The answer is no. Any attack on Russia or the US will result in a full-scale nuclear response. The decision times are too short, the analysis cannot be completed quickly enough, and the emotion of the situation will prompt a mass response. A bona fide attack, based on the currently available surveillance information will result in this decision.
To sum this up, if Russia sticks by its doctrine of escalate to de-escalate, and the escalation leads to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, then the eventual escalation to a full-scale nuclear war becomes almost inevitable. If NATO were to back down and allow Russia to use nuclear weapons to gain their objectives in Ukraine, then I see no reason why Russia/Putin would not use the same strategy to gain further territorial concessions. We’ve seen this scenario before at the beginning of World War II with the Japanese expansion in China and then the Western Pacific, Italy’s use of force in Africa, and Germany’s territorial demands in Europe. It wasn’t until the strong Western European countries and the U.S. finally committed to full-scale conventional war and eventually, in the case of Japan, strategic nuclear war, that they were able to bring an end to that conflict. The same situation is occurring in Europe today. At some point, NATO will have to strongly and unequivocally announce their intentions to use nuclear weapons to stop any use of nuclear weapons by Russia. If the Russians don’t believe this and use nuclear weapons, NATO must be prepared to respond in kind. At that point, it will be Russia’s decision on destroying the world as we know it. An alternative is surrendering and that would be a step too far, it would be accepting Russian and Chinese domination of the world. Hopefully, it won’t come to this. Let’s close with a quote, a famous line from the movie Wargames concerning nuclear war, “A strange game. The only winning move is not to play.”